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Abstract—The use of energy harvesting as a counter-jamming
measure is investigated on the premise that part of the harmful
interference can be harvested to increase the transmit power. We
formulate the strategic interaction between a pair of legitimate
nodes and a malicious jammer as a zero-sum game. Our analysis
demonstrates that the legitimate nodes are able to neutralize
the jammer. However, this policy is not necessarily a Nash
equilibrium and hence is sub-optimal. Instead, harvesting the
jamming interference can lead to relative gains of up to 95%,
on average, in terms of Shannon capacity, when the jamming
interference is high.
Index Terms—Energy harvesting, jamming, game theory
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the simultaneous wireless information and
power transfer has gained momentum in the realm of energy
harvesting (EH) technologies. In this contribution, we focus
on systems employing a time-splitting EH approach [1]–[4],
i.e., during a first phase the receiver collects energy from
RF microwave radiation and in a second phase it uses the
harvested energy for data transfer.
An interesting application of such EH approaches arises for
wireless systems under jamming attacks. In the past, two main
counter-jamming approaches have been commonly considered:
direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) and frequency hop-
ping spread spectrum (FHSS), [5], [6]. More recently, the
use of multiple antennas has been exploited in [7] against
both jamming and eavesdropping. In the first two approaches,
the impact of power constrained jammers can be limited by
increasing the spectral resources because the optimal jamming
strategy is to spread the jamming power over the entire
bandwidth; whereas the former requires an increased number
of antennas. In the present work, we alternatively explore the
possibility of mitigating jamming attacks by using EH without
increasing the spectral or the spatial resources. So far, there
has only been a limited number of contributions in this area
[8]–[11].
In [8], the jamming interference is harvested and exploited
in a two-way channel assuming that the jammer’s policy is
fixed (i.e., the jammer is not strategic). Furthermore, in [9]
a cooperative relay wiretap channel is studied, in which the
helping nodes harvest energy from the legitimate link and then
generate interference to the eavesdropper. On the other hand,
in [11], it is shown that EH can be exploited to mitigate
jamming attacks in wireless secret key generation (SKG)
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Fig. 1. System model and time sharing scheme at Alice’s side.
systems and that it is possible to neutralize the jammer, i.e.,
to fully compensate its impact on the SKG rate. Building on
this idea, the objective of the present work is to investigate
whether EH at the legitimate transmitter can be an efficient
measure against jamming attacks. We investigate the strategic
interaction between a pair of legitimate nodes and a jammer
employing as utility function the Shannon capacity.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows. First, we demonstrate that the jamming attack can
be prevented entirely by adjusting the EH duration, i.e., the
jammer can be neutralized (or forced to remain silent). This is
only possible when the quality of the channel in the harvesting
link is higher than in the jamming link. Nevertheless, neutral-
izing the jammer imposes too stringent restrictions on the EH
duration and on the legitimate transmit power and hence is not
optimal.
Second, we formulate a zero-sum game between the legit-
imate users and the jammer and derive the Nash equilibrium
(NE) analytically. At the NE, both players transmit at full
power, while, the optimal EH duration depends on the sys-
tem parameters. Interestingly, we show that the NE always
outperforms neutralizing the jammer. At the NE, the jamming
interference is not fully cancelled but rather exploited, partic-
ularly efficient in the high jamming interference regime.
This work represents a proof of concept of the potential use
of EH against jamming attacks, relying on widely used system
model assumptions [1]–[3], [5], [6], [10], [11]. Demonstration
of the proposed EH policy in a real testbed is left as future
work, in which the effect of imperfect channel estimation, type
I and II jamming detection errors, implementation aspects of
EH, etc., will also be considered.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model, depicted in Fig. 1, comprises three
nodes: a legitimate transmitter, Alice, its intended receiver,
Bob, and a malicious jammer, Jay. The channel coefficients
in the links Alice-Bob, Jay-Alice and Jay-Bob are denoted
by H , GA and GB , respectively and model fading; they are
assumed to remain constant during each EH and transmission
2cycle and to change independently from one cycle to the next.
We assume that full channel state information is available at
all nodes.
When Alice sends a message XA to Bob, Jay can jam the
transmission. Bob’s observation YB can be expressed as:
YB = HXA +GBXJ + ZB, (1)
where the message XA ∼ N (0, p) is drawn from a Gaussian
codebook under a short-term power constraint 0 ≤ p ≤ P . Fi-
nally, ZB ∼ N (0, NB) models the effect of the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) in the Alice-Bob link. We consider
that Jay transmits Gaussian jamming signals XJ ∼ N (0, γ)
and 0 ≤ γ ≤ Γ represents the jamming power.
This paper studies whether EH can be exploited to harvest
the jamming interference and boost the transmit power. We
assume a time sharing scheme with two phases: the first phase
of duration τT , where T is the symbol period, is dedicated to
EH. The second phase of duration (1 − τ)T is dedicated to
information transmission.
Alice’s observation during the EH phase is then given by:
YA = GAXJ + ZA, (2)
where ZA ∼ N (0, NA) models the effect of AWGN noise in
the link Jay-Alice. As commonly assumed [2], the harvested
energy is proportional to the energy of the received signal:
E = τT ζE
[
|YA|
2
]
= τT ζ
(
γ|GA|
2 +NA
)
, (3)
where ζ ∈ [0, 1] is the harvesting efficiency parameter. The
average power harvested during the EH phase is used in the
information transmission phase and is given as follows:
pEH =
τ
1− τ
ζ
(
γ|GA|
2 +NA
)
. (4)
The multiplicative term 11−τ in the above expression stems
from keeping the energy constant during each transmission
phase of duration (1−τ)T [11]. The initially available transmit
power (aside from the harvested one) is also enhanced to p1−τ
for the same reason. Under the above assumptions and using
standard time sharing arguments [12], the Shannon capacity
of the Alice-Bob link is given by
CEH(p, τ, γ) =
(1 − τ)
2
log
Ñ
1 +
Ä
p
1−τ + p
EH
ä
|H |2
γ|GB|2 +NB
é
.
(5)
Note that the multiplicative term (1 − τ) in front of the
logarithm represents the reduction of the Shannon capacity
due to time sharing.
III. JAMMER NEUTRALIZATION
In this Section, we first investigate whether it is possible
to neutralize the jammer. We note that CEH is increasing
with the transmit power p for fixed τ and γ. On the other
hand, CEH is not necessarily decreasing with the jamming
power: since the interference is harvested and pEH increases
with γ, the Shannon capacity may even increase with the
interfering power γ for specific system parameters. Although
this may seem counter-intuitive, consider the case in which the
interfering link is very poor |GB |2 << 1 (e.g., Jay is very far
from Bob). In this case, the interference at Bob is negligible:
γ|GB|2 +NB ≃ NB and, hence, CEH increases with γ due
to pEH . We prove this result rigorously by investigating the
first-order derivatives of CEH .
Proposition 1: For fixed p and τ , if |GA|
2
NA
> |GB|
2
NB
,
then CEH(p, τ, γ) is monotonically increasing w.r.t. γ if
p ≤ pth(τ) , τK , with K ,
(
|GA|
2NB
|GB|2
−NA
)
ζ, and it is
monotonically decreasing w.r.t. γ if p > pth(τ). This implies:
arg max
γ∈[0,Γ]
CEH(p, τ, γ) = 0, if p ≤ pth(τ), (6)
arg max
γ∈[0,Γ]
CEH(p, τ, γ) = Γ, if p > pth(τ). (7)
Otherwise, CEH(p, τ, γ) is always monotonically decreasing
w.r.t. γ for any fixed p and τ and
arg max
γ∈[0,Γ]
CEH(p, τ, γ) = Γ. (8)
Intuitively, if the quality of the harvesting link is higher than
that of the jamming link
|GA|
2
NA
> |GB|
2
NB
, then the legitimate
users can neutralize the jammer by tuning the transmit power p
and the EH policy τ such that p ≤ pth(τ). This highlights the
existence of a power threshold pth(τ) below which, harvesting
the jamming interference in the first phase overcomes the
harmful jamming in the second phase. The optimal strategy
(p, τ) that neutralizes the jammer (NJ) is given below.
Theorem 1: If
|GA|
2
NA
> |GB |
2
NB
, the strategy that maximizes
the capacity while neutralizing the jammer (pNJ , τNJ ) is
given as follows:
a) If p−1th (P ) > 1, then (p
NJ , τNJ ) = (pth(τˆ ), τˆ ), where
p−1th (p) =
p
K
is the inverse function of pth(τ).
b) Otherwise, the optimal strategy is
(pNJ , τNJ ) = argmax
(p,τ)∈{(p1,τ1),(p2,τ2)}
CEH(p, τ, 0),
(p1, τ1) = (min{pth(τˆ ), P},min{τˆ , p
−1
th (P )}),
(p2, τ2) = (P,max{τ˜ , p
−1
th (P )}),
where τˆ ∈ (0, 1) and τ˜ ∈ (0, 1) are the unique solutions of
the equations
∂CEH(pth(τ), τ, 0)
∂τ
= 0 and
∂CEH(P, τ, 0)
∂τ
= 0
respectively, which can be easily computed numerically.1
Fig. 2 illustrates the Shannon capacity obtained while
neutralizing the jammer, CEH(pNJ , τNJ , 0), as a function
of the signal to interference power ratio (SIR) defined as
SIR = P/Γ in the range P/Γ = −30 dB to P/Γ = 10 dB, for
various settings w.r.t. the channels gains for NA = −10 dBm,
NB = −7 dBm, Γ = 10 dBm, ζ = 0.8. These parameters
were chosen to showcase the different regimes in terms of
the optimal strategies at the NJ and NE states. Nevertheless,
all our remarks and observations are general and remain valid
irrespective of the specific choice of the system parameters.
1Finding explicit expressions for τˆ and τ˜ is non trivial and involves solving
nonlinear equations containing both logarithmic and fractional terms. Instead,
we can exploit numerical methods based on iterative one-dimensional search
(e.g., fzero in MATLAB®) or methods relying on trust region or Levenberg-
Marquardt techniques (e.g., fsolve in MATLAB®).
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Fig. 2. Shannon capacity while neutralizing the jammer as a function of SIR.
The jammer cannot be neutralized if the harvesting link is poor. Transmitting
at full power P is not always optimal.
The capacity CEH(pNJ , τNJ , 0) is zero for |H |2 = 0.2,
|GA|
2 = 0.2, |GB|
2 = 1 since the minimum condition on the
harvesting link quality is not met and the jammer cannot be
neutralized. In the other settings, we can identify two regimes
depending on whether p−1th (P ) ≤ 1 or not. When the SIR is
low, the system is in case b) of Theorem 1 and increasing P
increases the feasible set of the optimization problem and,
hence, the optimal value of the capacity. At higher SIR,
the system shifts to case a), in which the optimal solution
that neutralizes the jammer no longer depends on P . The
dashed black curve depicts the average CEH(pNJ , τNJ , 0)
over 10,000 random realizations of the channel gains drawn
from a standard Gaussian distribution.
We remark that to neutralize the jammer a non-zero EH
duration is required, i.e, τNJ > 0, during which little energy
can actually be harvested (as the jammer is silent). Also, the
transmit power may be required to be below the maximum
available power. In light of this, we next investigate the optimal
strategies of both parties in this competitive interaction.
IV. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES: GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS
In this Section, we study the adversarial interaction between
the legitimate users and the jammer using a non-cooperative
game [13]. More specifically, we formulate a two-player zero-
sum game defined as the triplet:
G = {{L, J}, {AL, AJ}, CEH(aL, aJ)}, where L and J de-
note the opposing players;AL = [0, P ]×[0, 1] andAJ = [0,Γ]
denote the possible actions the two players can take; and
CEH(aL, aJ) is both the utility of L and the cost of J . The
strategy of legitimate users is denoted by aL = (p, τ) and that
of the jammer by aJ = γ.
A natural solution of the game is the NE, denoted by
(aNEL , a
NE
J ), which is stable to unilateral deviations:
CEH(aNEL , a
NE
J ) ≥ C
EH(aL, a
NE
J ), ∀aL 6= a
NE
L ,
CEH(aNEL , a
NE
J ) ≤ C
EH(aNEL , aJ), ∀aJ 6= a
NE
J .
Neither the legitimate player nor the jammer have any interest
in deviating from the NE state knowing that their opponent is
playing the NE strategy.
Proposition 2: The NJ state, (pNJ , τNJ , 0) in Theorem 1,
is not a NE of the game G.
Proof: If p−1th (P ) > 1 then (p
NJ , τNJ) = (pth(τˆ ), τˆ ),
from Theorem 1. This cannot be a NE, because it implies
that pth(τˆ ) < P , and since C
EH is increasing in p then
player L should transmit at maximum power at the NE:
pNE = P . Otherwise, we have two cases: (pNJ , τNJ ) =
(P,max{τ˜ , p−1th (P )}) and (p
NJ , τNJ ) = (P, p−1th (P )). Nei-
ther can be NE: since the jammer is silent (γNJ = 0) and
only the noise NA is harvested, the legitimate user will deviate
from τNJ > 0 to τ = 0. EH operates as a threat to neutralize
the jammer, which results in an inefficient time sharing policy.
The game’s NE is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The NE of the game G is (pNE , τNE , γNE) =
(P, τNE ,Γ), where τNE ∈ {0, τ∗} with τ∗ ∈ (0, 1) the unique
solution of
∂CEH(P, τ,Γ)
∂τ
= 0 (9)
(which can be easily computed numerically), depending on the
system parameters. Moreover, the NE always outperforms the
NJ state.
Proof : The transmit power is maximum pNE = P since
CEH is increasing in the transmit power p. Then, we prove
by reductio ad absurdum that at the NE we have: pth(τ
NE) ≤
pNE , implying that γNE = Γ from Proposition 1. Finding
τNE reduces to solving the optimization problem:
τNE = arg max
τ∈[0,1]
CEH(P, τ,Γ). (10)
Based on the first and second order derivatives, CEH(P, τ,Γ)
is concave and either decreases (τNE = 0) or it has a
unique critical point (τNE = τ∗), depending on the pa-
rameters. To prove that the NE always outperforms the NJ
state, we use two ingredients. From Proposition 1, whenever
p = pth(τ), the Shannon capacity is constant w.r.t. γ and,
hence, CEH(pNJ , τNJ , 0) = CEH(pNJ , τNJ ,Γ). From the
NE definition and knowing that pNE = P and γNE = Γ:
(P, τNE) = argmax
p,τ
CEH(p, τ,Γ). (11)
These two facts yield that the NE outperforms the NJ state:
CEH(pNJ , τNJ , 0) ≤ CEH(P, τNE ,Γ).
In Fig. 3, we compare the capacity at the NE,
CEH(P, τNE ,Γ), with the capacity when neutralizing the
jammer, CEH(pNJ , τNJ , 0), normalized to the former by
illustrating
FNJ ,
CEH(P, τNE ,Γ)− CEH(pNJ , τNJ , 0)
CEH(P, τNE ,Γ)
. (12)
The simulation setting is identical to Fig. 2. We remark that
the NE always outperforms the NJ policy, which is consistent
to our analysis. The intuition is that, when neutralizing the
jammer, Alice does not necessarily transmit at maximum
power P and has to spend a minimum proportion of time
τNJ > 0 for EH, as a threat to force the jammer to remain
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Fig. 3. NE vs. NJ efficiency: FNJ in (12) as a function of SIR. The
NE always outperforms the NJ state. At low SIR, exploiting the dominant
jamming interference is more beneficial than silencing the jammer. At high
SIR, neutralizing the jammer via EH is inefficient.
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Fig. 4. EH efficiency: F in (13) as a function of SIR. EH is particularly
beneficial at low SIR when the dominant jamming interference can be
exploited. At high SIR, the interference becomes negligible and EH is less
useful.
silent, even though no energy can actually be harvested during
this time. Only in two of the four specific channel settings, the
capacity at the NJ state equals the NE capacity and only at
specific SIR values (the 0% minimum points). Surprisingly,
using EH to neutralize the jammer is not beneficial in most
cases. Instead, the legitimate users should harvest the jamming
interference and use it for information transmission. The 100%
relative gain curve corresponds to the case in which the
jammer cannot be neutralized because of the poor quality of
the harvesting link. The dashed black curve represents the
average efficiency of the NE w.r.t. the NJ state and shows
a relative gain between 64%− 75%.
In the same setting, in Fig. 4 we evaluate the efficiency of
EH as a measure against a strategic jammer and compare the
capacity at the NE, CEH(P, τNE ,Γ), with CEH(P, 0,Γ), the
capacity in absence of EH capability normalized to the former,
by analyzing
F ,
CEH(P, τNE ,Γ)− CEH(P, 0,Γ)
CEH(P, τNE ,Γ)
. (13)
At low SIR, the relative EH gain in terms of capacity is very
high, approaching 100% when the gain of the harvesting link
is high. The jamming interference is dominant and exploiting
it for useful communication is very beneficial. At high SIR,
the gain from EH decreases progressively towards zero since
the jamming interference that can be harvested becomes neg-
ligible. The potential of using EH as an anti-jamming measure
is demonstrated by the substantial relative gains in terms of
Shannon capacity that can on average reach 95% in the low
SIR regime.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that EH can be exploited to
efficiently mitigate jamming attacks. We proved that a jammer
can be completely neutralized by appropriately tuning the
transmit power and the EH duration. However, this restricts the
transmit power of the legitimate user and requires a minimum
harvesting duration, during which little energy can actually be
harvested (as the jammer is forced to remain silent). Therefore,
neutralizing the jammer is not necessarily optimal. Employing
a zero-sum game formulation, we showed that at the NE both
players should transmit at full power and the optimal EH
duration depends on the system parameters. Our simulation
results show that EH can offer substantial gains in terms
of capacity. At low SIR, the average gains can reach 95%,
showcasing the high potential of EH as an efficient counter-
jamming measure.
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